Video data hiding for managing privacy information in surveillance systems by Jithendra K. Paruchuri et al.
Video Data Hiding for managing Privacy
Information in Surveillance Systems
Jithendra K. Paruchuri, Sen-ching S. Cheung and Michael W. Hail
ABSTRACT
From copyright protection to error concealment, video data hiding has found usage in a great
number of applications. In this work, we introduce the detailed framework of using data hiding for
privacy information preservation in a video surveillance environment. To protect the privacy of
individuals in a surveillance video, the images of selected individuals need to be erased, blurred
or re-rendered. Such video modiﬁcations, however, destroy the authenticity of the surveillance
video. We propose a new rate-distortion based compression-domain video data hiding algorithm
for the purpose of storing that privacy information. Using this algorithm, we can safeguard
the original video as we can reverse the modiﬁcation process if proper authorization can be
established. The proposed data hiding algorithm embeds the privacy information in optimal
locations that minimize the perceptual distortion and bandwidth expansion due to the embedding
of privacy data in the compressed domain. Both reversible and irreversible embedding techniques
are considered within the proposed framework and extensive experiments are performed to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
Video Surveillance has become a part of our daily lives. Closed-circuit cameras are mounted
in countless shopping malls for deterring crimes, at toll booths for assessing tolls, and at trafﬁc
intersections for catching speeding drivers. Since the 9-11 terrorist attack, there have been
much research efforts directed at applying advanced pattern recognition algorithms to video
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surveillance. While the objective is to turn the labor intensive surveillance monitoring process
into a powerful automated system for counter-terrorism, there is a growing concern that the
new technologies can severely undermine individual’s rights of privacy. The combination of
ubiquitous cameras, wireless connectivity, and powerful recognition algorithms make it easier
than ever to monitor every aspect of our daily activities.
The third author of this manuscript has conducted a recent survey assessing citizens across
demographic groups to see if they were comfortable with expansion of government video
surveillance if it protected privacy rights1. The survey research was conducted utilizing a modiﬁed
list-assisted Waksberg-Mitofsky random-digit dialing procedure for sampling and the population
surveyed was non-institutionalized Kentuckians eighteen years of age and older. The margin
of error is ±3.3% at the 95% conﬁdence interval. The respondents were asked, “Do you have
a video security system that is used routinely?” The results reﬂected that 55% of employed
Kentuckians have an operative video surveillance system at their workplace. We then asked of
those employed, “Would you be interested in a video surveillance system at work if you knew
it could protect an individual’s privacy?” The solid majority of 60% expressed that they were
interested in privacy protecting video surveillance. Urban residents, those in higher income levels,
and those with advanced education attainment all were more disposed to privacy protecting video
technology. Additionally, focus groups of law enforcement, ﬁrst responders, hospitals, and public
infrastructure managers have all reﬂected strong interest in privacy protecting video technology.
To mitigate public’s concern on privacy violation, it is thus imperative to make privacy
protection a priority in developing new surveillance technologies. There have been many recent
work in enhancing privacy protection in surveillance systems [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8].
Many of them share the common theme of identifying sensitive information and applying image
processing schemes for obfuscating that sensitive information. But the security ﬂaw overlooked
in most of these current systems is that they fail to consider the security impact of modifying
the surveillance videos. There are a number of security measures that must be incorporated
before such modiﬁcations can be deployed. Firstly, mechanisms must be in place to authenticate
modiﬁed videos so that no one can falsify a different modiﬁed video by adding and deleting
1The survey was a cooperative effort through the University of Kentucky annual Kentucky Survey and the research was
sponsored by a grant from the US Department of Homeland Security through the National Institute for Hometown Security.
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images of objects or individuals. We call this measure privacy data authentication. The second
measure is that the original video must be preserved and can only be retrieved under proper
authorization. This is of paramount importance to any privacy protection schemes as all schemes
are selective in the sense that the sensitive content are intended to a certain group for a certain
purpose. No content should be permanently erased. For example, in a corporation, the security
camera ofﬁcer may have access to video contents of all visitors but not the employees; the chief
privacy ofﬁcer will have access to video contents of visitors and all employees except for the
executive team but the law enforcement, with a proper order from the court, will have access to
the true original footage. It has been postulated that such a static privacy policy would not be
sufﬁcient in more sophisticated environments or other sharing applications like teleconference
where each participant might need to control the accessibility capability of each consumer of
the content as in [9]. We call this measure privacy data preservation.
As explained above, except for the simplest organization, merely keeping the original video
in encrypted form will not be sufﬁcient in addressing these needs. On the other hand, it is
advantageous to reuse the infrastructure of existing standard based video surveillance systems as
much as possible. In this work, we propose using video data hiding for preserving the privacy
information in the modiﬁed video itself in a seamless fashion. Using data hiding, the video bit
stream will be accessible for both regular and authorized decoders but only the later can retrieve
the hidden privacy information. The use of data hiding for privacy data preservation makes it
completely independent from the obfuscation step unlike in some other work [10], [11]. Also,
the presence of a single bit stream makes the process of video authentication much simpler to
handle. Digitally signing the data hidden bit stream will authenticate the original video as well
as all levels of privacy protected data.
From copyright protection to error concealment, video data hiding has found usage in a great
number of applications. But the application of using data hiding for privacy data preservation is
unique in the sense it requires huge amount of information to be embedded in the video without
disturbing the compression bit syntax. Since data hiding disturbs the underlying statistical patterns
of the source data, it adversely affects the performance of compression which are designed based
on the statistical properties of the data. As such, it is imperative to design a data hiding scheme
that is compatible with the compression algorithm and at the same time, introduces as little
perceptual distortion as possible. In this paper, we propose a novel compression-domain video
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data-hiding algorithm that determines the optimal embedding strategy to minimize both the output
perceptual distortion and the output bit rate. The hidden data is embedded into selective Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT) coefﬁcients which are found in most video compression standards. The
coefﬁcients are selected based on minimizing a cost function that combines both distortion and
bit rate via a user-controlled weighting. Two methods are proposed – exhaustive search and fast
Lagrangian approximation. While the former produces optimal results, the latter approach is
signiﬁcantly faster and amenable to real-time implementation. Also two different embedding
approaches are discussed. The ﬁrst approach produces better compression performance but
causes irreversible changes even for the authorized decoder while the second approach is both
imperceptible to the regular decoder as well as completely reversible to the authorized decoder.
But this additional reversibility comes only at the cost of compression performance as the motion
feedback loop can longer be used and hence this technique can be applied only to intra-coded
frames or enhancement layers in a scalable codec. This reversible embedding is especially useful
in certain applications where the data hiding cannot change the cover data even at a bit level.
We can summarize the contributions of this paper as follows:
1) Propose a Privacy-Protected Video Surveillance System which can authenticate and pre-
serve the privacy information.
2) Propose a data hiding framework for managing privacy information which can support any
kind of video modiﬁcation.
3) Propose a compression domain data hiding algorithm which offers high level of hiding
capacity by embedding privacy information in selected transform coefﬁcients optimized in
terms of distortion and bit-rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First in Section II, we brieﬂy review the state-of-
the-art in privacy protection and management systems and video data hiding. In Section III, we
describe the higher level design of our privacy protection system and its components. Section IV
introduces the data hiding framework for managing privacy information and various embedding
techniques and perceptual distortion and rate models. Keeping the special constraints of data
hiding for this application in consideration, we propose the optimization framework to ﬁnd the
embedding locations in section V. Experimental results are presented in Section VI followed by
conclusions in Section VII.
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II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review existing work on visual privacy protection technologies followed
by video data hiding techniques. There is a recent surge of interest in selective protection of
visual objects in video surveillance. The PrivacyCam surveillance system developed at IBM
protects privacy by revealing only the relevant information such as object tracks or suspicious
activities [8]. Such a system is limited by the types of events it can detect and may have problems
balancing privacy protection with the particular needs of a security ofﬁcer. Alternatively, one
can modify the video to obfuscate the appearance of individuals for privacy protection. In [1],
the authors propose a privacy protecting video surveillance system which utilizes RFID sensors
to identify incoming individuals, ascertains their privacy preference speciﬁed in an XML-based
privacy policy database, and ﬁnally uses a simple video masking technique to selectively conceal
authorized individuals and display unauthorized intruders in the video. While [1] may be the
ﬁrst to describe a privacy protected video surveillance system, there are a large body of work
that utilize such kinds of video modiﬁcation for privacy protection. They range from the use
of black boxes or large pixels in [2], [3] to complete object removal as in [1]. New techniques
have also been proposed recently to replace a particular face with a generic face [6], [12] or a
body with a stick ﬁgure [7] or complete object removal followed by inpainting of background
and other foreground objects [13], [14].
All the above work target only at the modiﬁcation of the video but not at the feasibility of
recovering original video securely. To securely preserve the original video, selective scrambling
of sensitive information using a private key have been recently proposed in [10], [11], [15].
These schemes differ in terms of the types of information scrambled which leads to different
complexity and compression performances – spatial pixels are scrambled in [10], DCT signs
and Wavelet coefﬁcients are used in [11] and [15] respectively. With the appropriate private
key, the scrambling can be undone to retrieve the original video. These techniques have the
advantages of simplicity with modiﬁed regions clearly marked. However, there are a number
of drawbacks. First, similar to pixelation and blocking, scrambling is unable to fully protect
the privacy of individuals, revealing their routes, motion, shape, and even intensity levels [6].
Second, as obfuscation is usually the ﬁrst step in a complex process chain of a smart surveillance
system, it introduces artifacts that can affect the performance of subsequent image processing.
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Lastly, the coupling of scrambling and data preservation prevents other obfuscation schemes like
object replacement or removal to be used.
Using data hiding for privacy data preservation is more ﬂexible as it completely isolates
preservation from modiﬁcation. Since our introduction of using data hiding for privacy data
preservation in [16], there have been other work like [17], [18], [19], [9] and [20] that employ a
similar approach. Data hiding has been used in various applications such as copyright protection,
authentication, ﬁngerprinting and error concealment. Each application imposes a different set of
constraints in terms of capacity, perceptibility and robustness [21]. Privacy data preservation
certainly demands a large embedding capacity as we are hiding an entire video bitstream in the
modiﬁed video. Perceptual quality of the embedded video is also of great importance as it effects
the usability of the video for further processing. Robustness refers to the survivability of the
hidden data under various processing operations. While it is a key requirement for applications
like copyright protection and authentication, it is of less concern to a well-managed video
surveillance system targeted to serve a single organization. Thus, we are focusing mainly on
high-capacity fragile data hiding schemes. Another dimension is the reversibility of the hiding
process which dictates if the embedded video can be fully restored after the hidden data is
removed. While irreversible data hiding usually produces higher hiding capacity, reversible data
hiding may be important for maintaining the authenticity of the original video. We shall consider
both in this work.
Most irreversible data embedding and extracting approaches can be classiﬁed into two classes
– spread spectrum and quantization index modulation (QIM). Spread spectrum techniques treats
the data hiding problem as the transmission of the hidden information over a communication
channel corrupted by the covered data [22]. QIM techniques use different quantization code-
books to represent the covered data with the selection of code-books based on the hidden
information [23]. QIM-based techniques usually have higher capacities than spread-spectrum
schemes. The capacity of any QIM scheme is determined by the design of the quantization
schemes. In [24], the authors propose to hide large volume of information into the nonzero
DCT terms after quantization. This method cannot provide sufﬁcient embedding capacity for
our application because surveillance videos have high temporal correlation with a very large
fraction of DCT coefﬁcients being zero in the inter-coded frames. In [25], the authors propose
to implement the embedding in both zero and non-zero DCT coefﬁcients but only in macro
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blocks with low inter frame velocity. This framework deals only with minimizing perceptual
distortion without considering the increase in bit rate. Our initial scheme in [16] embeds the
watermark bits at the high frequency DCT coefﬁcients during the compression process. Similar
to [25], this method works well in terms of maintaining the output video quality but at an expense
of much higher output bit rate.
Reversible data embedding can be broadly classiﬁed into three categories. The ﬁrst class of
methods like [26] and [27] basically use lossless compression to create space for data hiding.
The key idea is to embed the recovery information along with the hidden data to enable the
reversibility at the decoder. This method is not suitable for our application because of its low
capacity and that the information to be embedded is already a compressed bit stream. The second
class of methods like [28] and [29] work on residual expansion between pairs of coefﬁcients in
various transform domains. These methods assume high correlation between coefﬁcients, hence
most of the pairs would not overﬂow even after expanding the difference. The drawback of
these schemes is the higher perceptual distortion caused due to signiﬁcant changes in coefﬁcient
values. The third category of algorithms like [30] work on the concept of histogram bin shifting.
This is suitable for our application because the histogram of DCT residue is Laplacian so that we
can hide information with small-magnitude coefﬁcients without imposing signiﬁcant perceptual
distortion.
In Section V, we describe a new approach of optimally placing hidden information in the DCT
domain that simultaneously minimizes both the perceptual distortion and output bitrate. Our
algorithm considers both rate and distortion and produces an optimal distribution of hidden bits
among various DCT blocks. Our main contribution in the data hiding algorithm is an optimization
framework to combine both the distortion and rate together as a single cost function and to use it
in identifying the optimal locations to hide data. This allows a signiﬁcant amount of information
to be embedded into compressed bitstreams without disproportional increase in either output bit
rate or perceptual distortion. This algorithm works for both irreversible and reversible embedding
approaches.
III. PRIVACY PROTECTED VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
In order to appreciate the role of privacy data preservation, it is imperative to understand how
it ﬁts into the overall architecture of a privacy protected video surveillance system. A high level
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description of our proposed system is shown in Figure 1 and more details about this system can
be found in [31]. The system contains a subject identiﬁcation module unit which uses RFID tags
to identify and discriminate an authorized user from others. The input video from the camera
units is processed to identify and extract out the privacy information and the empty regions
left behind by the removal of objects are perceptually ﬁlled in the Obfuscation Unit using video
in-painting as proposed in [14]. The privacy object information is sent to the Secure Data Hiding
unit to be encrypted and embedded inside the modiﬁed video. This entire process is done within
the secure camera system, which is a trusted environment within which raw privacy data or
decryption keys are used. All the processing units are connected through an open local area
network, and as such, all privacy information must be encrypted before transmission and the
identities of all involved units must be validated. The Privacy Data Management System provides
the necessary key distribution and privacy policy management so as to support selective and
secure recovery of original video based on the status and policy speciﬁed by an individual user.
Fig. 1. High-level description of the proposed privacy-protecting video surveillance system.
In this paper, we limit our discussion to the data hiding unit used for integrating the privacy
information with the modiﬁed video. The privacy information contains the image objects of the
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individuals carrying the RFID tags, each padded with a black background to make a rectangular
frame and compressed using a H.263 version 2 video encoder [32]. The embedding process is
performed at frame level so that the decoder can reconstruct the privacy information as soon as
the compressed bitstream of the same frame has arrived. Before the embedding, the compressed
bitstream for each object is encrypted using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a
128-bit key and appended with a small ﬁxed-size header. Details of the encryption process, key
management and the header format can be found in [31]. It is this encrypted data stream that is
embedded into the modiﬁed video. The data hiding scheme is combined with the video encoder
and produces a H.263-compliant bitstream of the protected video to be stored in the database.
The privacy protected video can be accessed without any restriction with a standard decoder as
all the privacy information are encrypted and hidden in the bitstream. With a special decoder,
the hidden data can be retrieved and the authorized user can decrypt the privacy information
corresponding to his access level.
IV. HIDING PRIVACY INFORMATION
In this section, we describe the various components in our proposed data hiding unit. Figure
2 shows the overall design of the data hiding unit and its interaction with the video compres-
sion algorithm. Our data hiding is integrated with a typical motion-compensated DCT video
compression algorithm such as H.263. In Figure 2, the purple area contains the components of
the data hiding module while the green area contains those of the compression module. There
are two inputs to this combined unit: the ﬁrst one is the Privacy Protected Video with the
sensitive information already redacted. The second input is the compressed video bitstreams of
the privacy information, encrypted based on the approach described in Section III. The goal is to
hide the second input in the ﬁrst input in a joint data-hiding compression framework. After the
motion compensation process, the residue of the privacy protected video is converted into the
DCT domain. The embedding step is introduced between the ﬁnal step of entropy coding and
the DCT. This ensures that the decoder gets the same reference frame to prevent any drifting
errors. The encrypted video stream is hidden, using a modiﬁed parity embedding scheme, in
the luminance DCT blocks which occupy the largest portion of the bit stream. The positions of
embedding are obtained using a R-D optimization framework to minimize the distortion and rate
increase for a target embedding requirement. The distortion is based on human visual system
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and a perceptual mask in DCT domain is used to facilitate the calculation. The distortion and
rate calculations for the R-D block and the embedding techniques are explained in the following
subsections. The full details of the optimization algorithm is given in Section V. Note that
while the proposed data hiding algorithm is general enough to be used in any video codec, the
distortion and rate calculations are speciﬁc to a H.263 codec.
Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of the data hiding and video compression system
A. Perceptual Distortion
To identify the embedding locations that cause the minimal disturbance to visual quality, we
need a distortion metric to input into our optimization framework. Mean square distortion does
not work for our goal of ﬁnding the optimal DCT coefﬁcients to embed data bits – as DCT
is an orthogonal transform, the mean square distortion for the same number of embedded bits
will always be the same regardless of which DCT coefﬁcients are used. Instead, we adopt the
DCT perceptual model proposed by Watson [33], which has been shown to better correlate
with the human visual system than standard mean square distortion. While there are other more
sophisticated video-based perceptual models such as the one in [34], we adopt the Watson model
for its simplicity to be included in our optimization algorithm.
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The Watson model takes into accounts the overall luminance, contrast and frequency of a
coefﬁcient, and calculates a perceptual mask s(i,j,k) that indicates the maximum just-noticeable
change to c(i,j,k), the (i,j)th coefﬁcient of the kth 8 × 8 DCT block of an image:
s(i,j,k)=m a x

tL(i,j,k),|c(i,j,k)|
0.7tL(i,j,k)
0.3
(1)
where
tL(i,j,k)=t(i,j)

c(0,0,k)
c0
0.649
(2)
for i,j ∈{ 0,1,...,7}. t(i,j) is the frequency sensitivity threshold, c(0,0,k) is the DC term
of block k, and c0 is the average luminance of the image [21]. The higher the mask value,
the less distortion the corresponding coefﬁcient will cost by embedding hidden data. As the
embedding is performed in the quantized coefﬁcient domain, it is convenient to normalize with
the quantization step-size and use the following distortion value instead:
D(i,j,k)=
QP
s(i,j,k)
(3)
where QP is the quantization parameter and s(i,j,k) is the perceptual mask value as calculated
in Equation (1). As a few highly distorted coefﬁcients account for more distortion than many
mildly distorted ones [21], an L4 norm pooling is employed for calculating the total distortion
over the entire frame:
D =


i,j,k
|D(i,j,k)|
4
 1
4
(4)
B. Irreversible Embedding Process
To embed data in the compressed bitstream, we follow the QIM approach in which quantization
is altered based on the hidden data. Let c(i,j,k) and q(i,j,k) be the (i,j)-th coefﬁcient of the
k-th DCT block before and after quantization respectively. They are related as in Equation (5)
where QP is the chosen quantization parameter at the codec.
q(i,j,k)=
	
c(i,j,k)+QP
2 · QP


(5)
The maximum error due to the quantization will be QP as reconstruction values are centered
in the quantization bins of width 2 · QP. To enable the data hiding, the quantization is made
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coarser with the ﬁner levels reserved to represent the embedded bits. To embed a L-bit number
V in a coefﬁcient, the quantized coefﬁcient can be altered in two different ways:
˜ q(i,j,k)=
	
c(i,j,k)+2 L · QP
2L+1 · QP


· 2
L + V (6)
or
˜ q(i,j,k)=

c(i,j,k)+2 L · QP
2L+1 · QP

· 2
L +( V − 2
L) (7)
The choice of embedding with (6) or (7) depends on which method produces a reconstructed
value closer to the real c(i,j,k). Hidden data extraction is straightforward – for a L-bit embedding
in a particular coefﬁcient, it is given as in Equation (8).
x =˜ q(i,j,k)m o d2
L (8)
This embedding, however, is not invertible. Since the quantization is altered to a coarser level
as part of data embedding, it causes irrecoverable loss of data. For a single bit embedding,
the maximum quantization noise doubles compared to that of without embedding. Besides the
irreversible changes to the coefﬁcient, the modiﬁed reference frame in the motion loop propagates
the effect of data hiding into future frames, making the changes permanent. This implies that the
reconstructed video will be slightly different from the originally compressed version. Such an
irreversible embedding method is not suitable for certain applications that demand the original
video to be unaltered by the data hiding process.
C. Reversible Embedding Process
Using the previous embedding technique, the decoder has no way to remove the distortion
introduced by the embedding process. In this subsection, we explain a reversible embedding
algorithm whose effect can be reversed on the decoder side after data extraction. A key require-
ment for our application is that the output bit-stream with hidden data must be decodable with
good quality by a standard-compliant decoder unaware of the embedding. This implies that we
need to avoid any error caused by drifting and as such, the decode frame with the hidden data
must be used in the feedback path in the motion loop. As the motion compensation does not
respect the DCT block boundary, the effect of hiding one bit in a DCT coefﬁcient may spread
to different spatial areas after many frames. It is an open question on how to make this temporal
spreading reversible. In our current implementation, we focus on making the DCT embedding
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process reversible and prevent temporal spreading by restricting our attention to either intra-coded
frames or intra-coded-enhanced frames in a two-layer scalable codec.
The reversible embedding algorithm exploits the fact that DCT coefﬁcients follow a Laplacian
distribution concentrated around zero with empty bins towards either ends of the distribution [30].
Due to the high concentration at the zero bin, we can embed high-volume of hidden data at the
zero coefﬁcients by shifting the bins right (or left) of zero to the right (or left). At the encoder
side, the embedding process is as follows: let Mk be the number of bits to be hidden in the
k-th quantized DCT block. Let L =  Mk/Zk  where Zk is the number of zero coefﬁcients in
this DCT block. In a dynamic order speciﬁed by optimization algorithm, we modify each DCT
coefﬁcients q(i,j,k) into ˜ q(i,j,k) using the following procedure until all the Mk bits of privacy
data are embedded. Notice that we have i =0 ,1,...,7 and j =0 ,1,...,7 and k is the DCT
block index.
1) If q(i,j,k) is zero, extract L bits from the privacy data buffer and set ˜ q(i,j,k)=q(i,j,k)+
2L−1 − V where V is the decimal value of these L privacy data bits.
2) If q(i,j,k) is negative, no embedding is done and ˜ q(i,j,k)=q(i,j,k) − 2L−1 − 1.
3) If q(i,j,k) is positive, no embedding is done and ˜ q(i,j,k)=q(i,j,k)+2 L−1.
The embedding is done only at zero coefﬁcients while all the other coefﬁcients visited in the
scan order are displaced in either positive or negative direction. Compared with the irreversible
embedding, the capacity here is smaller as data can only be embedded to zero coefﬁcients.
Also reversible embedding induces higher distortion as even some non-zero coefﬁcients must be
altered by (2L +1 )· QP without actually embedding at that position.
On the decoder side, it needs to extract the hidden bits and retrieve the original quantized
coefﬁcient q(i,j,k) from ˜ q(i,j,k). The decoder also knows the number of hidden bits Mk by
running the same rate distortion algorithm. To ﬁnd the number of coefﬁcients that contain the
hidden data, the decoder determines the minimum ˜ Zk such that ˜ Zk · L ≥ Mk where ˜ Zk is the
number of DCT coefﬁcients satisfying the condition −2L−1 < ˜ q(i,j,k) ≤ 2L−1. Following the
block speciﬁc pattern given by the optimization algorithm, the privacy data and the original DCT
coefﬁcient can be obtained as follows:
1) If −2L−1 < ˜ q(i,j,k) ≤ 2L−1, L hidden bits can be obtained as the binary equivalent of
the decimal number 2L−1 − ˜ q(i,j,k) and q(i,j,k)=0 .
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2) If ˜ q(i,j,k) ≤− 2L−1, no bit is hidden in this coefﬁcient and q(i,j,k)=˜ q(i,j,k)+2L−1−1.
3) If ˜ q(i,j,k) > 2L−1, no bit is hidden in this coefﬁcient and q(i,j,k)=˜ q(i,j,k) − 2L−1.
D. Rate Model
Data hiding effects the compression performance – simply choosing the distortion-optimal lo-
cations based on the perceptual model may increase the output bit-rate manyfold. As surveillance
video is typically quite static, many DCT blocks do not have any non-zero coefﬁcients. Hiding
bits into these zero blocks, while perceptual optimal, may signiﬁcantly increase the bit-rate. This
is caused by the fragmentation of the long run-length patterns which are assumed to be frequent
by the entropy coder. One possible approach to mitigate this problem is to limit the number of
blocks to be modiﬁed [16]. However, the fewer blocks used for embedding, the more spatially
concentrated the embedding becomes which will make the distortion more visible. As such, we
need to measure the increase in rate by different embedding strategies so as to produce the
optimal trade-off with the distortion. The rate increase for a particular embedding is calculated
using the actual entropy coder used for compression. As both the encoder and the decoder need
to compute the rate function so as to derive the optimal data hiding positions, the actual privacy
data cannot be used as it is not available at the decoder. Instead, we approximate the embedding
by assuming the “worst-case” embedding, i.e. we choose the hidden bit value that causes the
higher increase in bit-rate.
V. RATE-DISTORTION OPTIMIZED DATA HIDING
In our joint data hiding and compression framework, we aim at minimizing the output bit rate
R and the perceptual distortion D caused by embedding M bits into the DCT coefﬁcients. By
using a user-speciﬁed control parameter δ, we combine the rate and distortion into a single cost
function as follows:
C =( 1− δ) · NF · D + δ · R (9)
where NF is a constant used to equalize the dynamic ranges of D and R so that varying δ
translates to trading-off between D and R. As such, NF is not a free parameter and is determined
based on the particular compression mechanism. On the other hand, the choice of δ depends on
applications – it is selected based on the particular application which may favor the least amount
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of distortion by setting δ close to zero, or the least amount of bit rate increase by setting δ close
to one. In order to avoid any overhead in communicating the embedding positions to the decoder,
both of these approaches compute the optimal positions based on the previously decoded DCT
frame so that the process can be repeated at the decoder. In our data hiding framework, the
constrained optimization can be formulated as follows:
min
Γ
C(Γ) subjected to M = N (10)
where M is the variable that denotes the number of coefﬁcients to be modiﬁed, N is the target
number of bits to be embedded, C is the cost function as described in Equation (9) and Γ is any
selection of M DCT coefﬁcients for embedding the data. We assume that a constant number
of bits are embedded at each DCT coefﬁcient2 and focus the optimization on choosing the
coefﬁcients for embedding. While it is entirely feasible to explore the dimension of embedding
different numbers of bits to different coefﬁcients, our preliminary experiments indicate that the
gain is too small to justify the signiﬁcant expansion of the search space for the optimization.
Lagrangian method turns a constrained optimization problem like (10) into an unconstrained
one, and is commonly used in rate-distortion optimized video compression. Using a Lagrange
Multiplier λ ≥ 0, the constrained optimization problem introduced in Equation (10) can be
turned into an unconstrained version:
min
Γ
Θ(Γ,λ) with Θ(Γ,λ)=C(Γ) + λ(M − N) (11)
If the unconstrained problem (11) for a particular λ ≥ 0 has an optimal solution that gives rise
to M = N, this will also be a solution to the original constrained problem [35]. We can further
simplify Equation (11) by decomposing it into the sum of similar quantities from each DCT
block k:
Θ(Γ,λ)=

k
Ck(Γk)+λ


k
Mk − N

(12)
=

k
(Ck(Γk)+λ(Mk − N/L)) (13)
where Γk denotes the particular selection of Mk coefﬁcient in the kth DCT block and L is
the total number of DCT blocks in a frame. The minimization can now be performed for each
2with the exception of the last DCT coefﬁcient for embedding which may contain less than the target number.
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block at different values of λ so as to make

k Mk = N. There are two sub-problems here.
First, while the second term on the right side in (13) is constant for a particular value of λ, the
minimization of the ﬁrst term is not trivial. In other words, we need to ﬁnd an optimal subset
of Mk coefﬁcients in the kth DCT block to minimize the cost:
C
∗
k(Mk)=m i n
Γk
Ck(Γk) (14)
The second problem is an efﬁcient way to search for λ that provides an optimal allocation of
embedded bits to each block. The following two sub-sections describe our approach in tackling
these problems.
A. Cost Function Computation for DCT blocks
There are two components to the cost function introduced in Equation (9): distortion and rate
increase due to data hiding. Our distortion function as described in Equation (4) is additive with
each coefﬁcient having an independent contribution. The rate increase due to the modiﬁcation of a
coefﬁcient is far more complex. It depends on neighboring coefﬁcients as consecutive coefﬁcients
along the zigzag scan are encoded together as a single run-length pattern. In the H.263 standard,
a run-length pattern is deﬁned as a run of zero coefﬁcients followed by a non-zero coefﬁcient.
The length of the run and the non-zero coefﬁcient determine the length of the codeword, and
the longer the run-length, the shorter the codeword in the Huffman table becomes. Embedding
a bit in any zero coefﬁcients will break the run-length pattern into two and the bit-rate increase
will depend on the original and the resulting run-length patterns.
At ﬁrst glance, the interdependency created by the run-length coding seems to evade any
structural exploitation of the optimization problem. Exhaustive search of
K
M

patterns, where K
is the number of candidate coefﬁcients and M is the number of embedded bits, seems inevitable.
For a 8× 8 DCT block, such an exhaustive search will need to encode more than 1019 patterns
in order to determine all the optimal positions for embedding M =1 ,2,...,64 bits. This is
clearly impossible in practice. Fortunately, the “worst-case” embedding assumption in our rate
model as described in Section IV-D provides a Dynamic-Programming (DP) based solution to
the optimization problem. In the actual embedding procedure as described in Equations (6)
and (7), embedding a speciﬁc bit may turn a non-zero DCT coefﬁcient into zero and actually
reduces the bit-rate by making a run-length pattern longer. The “worst-case” embedding, which
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is employed without the knowledge of the hidden bit, assumes the worst case and never makes
a non-zero coefﬁcient zero. This simple observation enables us to develop a recursive solution
to the optimization problem based on the position of the last embedded bit.
Let f(s,M) denotes the minimum cost of embedding M bits into a DCT block with the last
bit embedded at the sth DCT coefﬁcient along the zigzag scan. Clearly, the optimal cost C∗(M)
of embedding M bits in this block can be found by the following equation3
C
∗(M)= m i n
s=1,...,64
f(s,M) (15)
Here we assume all 64 coefﬁcients are available for embedding which is the case for irreversible
embedding. For reversible embedding, we can simply limit our candidates to the zero coefﬁcients.
With the worst-case embedding, the embedding pattern that realizes f(s,M) must have a non-
zero sth DCT coefﬁcient. Denote t<sto be the embedding position of the M −1st embedded
bit. Since the tth DCT coefﬁcient must also be non-zero, the run-length patterns before and after
the tth coefﬁcients are independently coded. Let d(t,s) be the cost induced by the run-length
patterns between the tth and sth coefﬁcients. We can now compute f(s,M) using the following
recursion:
f(s,M)=m i n
t<s
[f(t,M − 1) + d(t,s)] (16)
This is precisely the Bellman’s principle that leads to a dynamic programming formulation to
solve for f(s,M) [36]. Now we can state the full algorithm to compute C∗(M) for M =
1,2,...,64 as below.
1) There are 64 stages with each stage representing the embedding of one bit. At stage M
where M =1 ,2,...,64, there are 65−M states representing all possible DCT coefﬁcients
in the zigzag order that can store the Mth embedded bit. The minimum cost function
f(s,M) will be computed at stage M and state s. The trellis depicting this construction
is shown in Figure 3.
2) The calculation starts from stage one. At stage M, we compute the cost function at state s
by ﬁrst worst-case embedding a bit at the sth coefﬁcient and then identifying the minimum
3Since the approach of computing the cost function is the same for each block, we drop the block index k in representing
the block cost function C
∗
k(Mk).
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combined cost among all the states up to s−1 in stage M −1 plus the extra cost incurred
by the embedding at the sth coefﬁcient.
3) Finally, the minimum cost of embedding M bits can be calculated by minimizing over all
the states in stage M.
Fig. 3. Figure showing the stages and states of the DP algorithm and the optimal path/solution
To compute the complexity of this DP algorithm, we note that 64 DCT coding patterns
are examined in the ﬁrst stage, 1+2+...+63 = 2016 in the second stage, 1+2+...+62 = 1953
in the third and so forth. Altogether one needs to examine 43,744 different DCT encoding
patterns to determine the minimum cost embedding. While this is a signiﬁcant reduction from
the naive exhaustive search, encoding one single DCT blocks so many times is still formidable
in practice. In our experiments, we have also investigated two more strategies in computing the
block cost function: the greedy approximation and a ﬁxed heuristic order within a DCT block.
Greedy embedding calculates one optimal embedding location at a time ignoring the complex
rate dependencies while heuristic approach takes a ﬁxed reverse zig-zag scan order from the end
of the DCT block. Table I summarizes the differences in the number DCT patterns examined
among all the approaches.
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Approach Number of DCT patterns examined
Exhaustive Search > 10
19
Dynamic Programming 43,744
Greedy 2,080
Fixed pattern 64
TABLE I
NUMBER OF DCT PATTERNS EXAMINED BY DIFFERENT ALGORITHMS IN COMPUTING C
∗(M)
B. Bit Allocation by Lagrangian Approximation
Sweeping through λ from 0 to ∞ will examine the convex hull of all the block cost functions
C∗
k(Mk). While there exist efﬁcient tree pruning techniques to search for the optimal value λ,
the large number of DCT blocks in a frame can still render such techniques computationally
intensive. As we shall demonstrate in Section VI, the block cost functions in most cases can be
well approximated by a second order curve. This allows us to devise a simple search strategy
to quickly identify the appropriate value of λ.
If one can approximate C∗
k(Mk) function as a differentiable function in the continuous domain
Mk, then the optimal solution to (13) must satisfy the so-called “equal-slope” criteria:
dC∗
k
dMk
= −λ (17)
for all k. Equation 17 implies that the optimal solution exists at a constant equal slope of −λ
for all block cost functions. At an equal slope on all the individual cost funcions, the rate of
increase or decrease in cost with respect to the bits embedded will be the same. Hence we need
to search for such constant slope over all the curves which satisfy the total target embedding
requirement. Approximating each cost function as a second-order polynomial yields
C
∗
k(Mk) ≈ ak · M
2
k + bk · Mk + ck (18)
The optimal slope that satisﬁes our embedding constraint can thus be obtained as follows
dC∗
k(Mk)
dMk
=2· ak · Mk + bk = −λ (19)
To meet the minimum embedding constraint, the total number of bits embedded from each DCT
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block must be equal to N:
N =

k
Mk = −λ ·

k

1
2 · ak

−

k

bk
2 · ak

Thus, λ can be determined as follows:
λ = −
N +

k

bk
2·ak


k

1
2·ak
 (20)
Since the actual problem is a discrete one, we can only use λ from Equation (20) as an initial slope
and search for the exact slope in its neighborhood to match our target embedding requirement.
At this optimal slope on each curve, we can identify the number of embedding locations Mk for
each DCT block. These Mk embedding locations within each block are chosen from the same
optimal order which are already calculated during the cost cuve generation process.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
We have tested our proposed schemes on six sequences using a variety of video obfuscation
techniques. These sequences include
Minnesota [37]: Two persons walk towards and cross each other while the camera is slowly
panning (39 frames).
Board: One person walk across the scene, brieﬂy occluded by a partition board (101
frames).
Two-persons: Two persons walk towards and cross each other (89 frames).
Three-persons: Two persons walk towards the right and one to the left, occluding each other
brieﬂy (73 frames).
Conference: Five persons sit around a conference table with two leaving one after the
other (356 frames).
Hall: A standard sequence used in video compression (299 frames).
All sequences are in CIF (352 × 288) format in YCbCr color space with 4:2:0 sub-sampling. The
ﬁrst four sequences are captured at 15 Hz and the hall monitor is at 30 Hz. For each sequence,
privacy objects are extracted according to a separate segmentation mask. The segmentation mask
of Minnesota is provided by the authors of [37] and that of Board is manually obtained. The
remainders are calculated using the background subtraction and object segmentation schemes
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described in [14]. The experiments assume all the privacy objects are compressed together in
the same privacy bitstream. In practice, multiple persons in the scene would result in multiple
bitstreams which will add complexity and payload to the whole process. Using MPEG-4 object-
based coding can certainly reduce this payload requirement. Complexity can be reduced by
parallelizing the compression of different objects. Three video obfuscation techniques are then
applied after the privacy objects are removed. They are (a) silhouette in which the holes are
replaced by black pixels, (b) scrambled in which the pixel values are exclusive-OR with a pseudo-
random sequence and (c) in-painted using an object-based video in-painting scheme from [14].
The original sequences, privacy objects and obfuscated sequences are shown in Figure 4 and are
available for download at the authors’ website 4.
The data hiding algorithm is implemented based on the TMN Coder Version 3.0 of the ITU-
T H.263 version 2 by University of British Columbia. All sequences are compressed using a
constant quantization parameter with the ﬁrst frame intra-coded and the remaining inter-coded.
Despite the differences in the original frame-rates among the sequences, the compression frame
rate has been set to 30 Hz. The encoding performance is measured based on running the program
on a Windows XP Professional machine with Intel Xeon Processor at 2GHz with 4GB memory.
A. Selection of DCT Coefﬁcients for Embedding
In the ﬁrst experiment, we consider the performances among different schemes in selecting
DCT coefﬁcients to embed hidden data. The three tested schemes are the DP-based optimal
scheme, the greedy scheme and the ﬁxed reversed zigzag patterns as described in Section V.
Figure 5 shows a typical5 graph of the cost function versus the number of bits embedded within
a single DCT block for each of the three schemes. The cost function is computed according to
Equation (9) with δ =0 .5 and NF =2 5 . For a ﬁxed number of hidden bits, the zigzag scheme
clearly produces worse results than both the greedy and the DP-based schemes. The greedy and
the DP-based schemes however produce very similar results. The corresponding curves are almost
convex which strongly suggests the optimality in using the discrete Lagrangian optimization for
4http://www.vis.uky.edu/∼cheung/datahiding
5The graphs show the results of the 100th DCT block from the Minnesota in-painted sequence but the trend is typical among
all sequences we have tested.
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Fig. 4. Different privacy protected sequences used in experiments: the ﬁrst column shows the privacy information; the second
column shows the sensitive areas replaced by silhouette; the third column shows the sensitive areas scrambled and the last
column shows the sensitive areas in-painted.
allocating hidden bits among different blocks. In addition, the curves can be well approximated by
a quadratic curve as shown in the ﬁgure, hence justifying the approximation we have introduced
in Section V-B.
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Fig. 5. Cost function versus number of bits embedded in a DCT block for different embedding scheme.
To further demonstrate the differences among these schemes, we have run them on four
different in-painted sequences to their entirety, focusing only on the irreversible embedding with
the quantization parameter ﬁxed at QP =1 0 . For all the DP-based, greedy and zigzag schemes,
we use the discrete Lagrangian based bit allocation method as described in Section V-B. Table II
summarizes the comparisons in terms of the resulting bitrate after compression with embedding,
the average luma PSNR after compression and embedding, the perceptual distortion as deﬁned
in (4), the average cost over the entire sequence and the encoding speed in seconds per frame.
There are relatively little differences among the three schemes in bitrate and PSNR. The zigzag
scheme produces higher distortion and cost while the DP-based and the greedy schemes produce
very similar results as expected. On the other hand, the encoding speeds are exactly the opposite
– the DP-based scheme needs around 895 seconds per frame, the greedy scheme needs 35
seconds and the zigzag needs only 1.5 second. Due to the high computational complexity of the
DP-based scheme, we focus on using the greedy scheme rather than the DP-based approach for
the remaining experiments.
We should point out that the computational speeds provided in Table II are based on a non-
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In-painted Sequences Minnesota Board Two-persons Three-persons
Bitrate (kbps)
DP optimal 927.3 96.9 344.8 472.3
Greedy 933.5 96.1 345.8 473.1
Zigzag 937.2 97.0 340.0 463.2
PSNR-Y (dB)
DP optimal 31.83 37.73 35.37 34.30
Greedy 31.84 37.80 35.36 34.31
Zigzag 31.62 37.73 35.33 34.28
Distortion
DP optimal 30.69 18.50 22.88 30.61
Greedy 30.84 18.83 22.95 30.46
Zigzag 42.96 22.43 29.67 38.55
Cost (NF =2 5 )
DP optimal 731.7 252.5 438.4 591.6
Greedy 736.7 256.3 439.7 590.2
Zigzag 889.9 301.7 520.8 686.3
Speed (sec/frame)
DP optimal 904.3 890.1 892.0 892.9
Greedy 35.5 35.2 34.8 35.1
Zigzag 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5
TABLE II
COMPARING THE PERFORMANCES AMONG DP-OPTIMAL,G REEDY AND ZIGZAG ON FOUR DIFFERENT IN-PAINTED
SEQUENCES.
optimized implementation of the algorithms and also include the entire compression process,
which amounts to roughly 0.6 second. Signiﬁcant speedup can be achieved, for example, by
updating only those blocks that are different from the previous frames as indicated by the
macroblock modes. In fact, as the motion in typical surveillance videos is scarce, it is conceivable
to update the cost function only occasionally rather than at every frame without losing much
optimality. Furthermore, the complexity is mainly due to the computation of the cost functions
for different DCT blocks which are certainly amenable to parallel implementation. While it is
not the focus of this paper on the real-time implementation of the data hiding process, we believe
that signiﬁcant improvement in computational speed is indeed possible.
B. Bit Allocation for DCT blocks
Our optimization process is a combination of two steps - bit allocation between blocks and
choosing optimal the positions within blocks as explained in sections V-B and V-A respectively.
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While the ﬁrst experiment focuses on different approaches of embedding within a single block,
we consider in the second experiment the effect of different approaches in allocating bits among
different blocks. To minimize the impact of data hiding on visual quality, [16] divides hidden data
equally among all the blocks in the residual frame. We compare this scheme with the proposed
Lagrangian approach and the results are shown in Table III. To ensure a fair comparison, we ﬁx
the greedy approach with λ =0to enforce a full emphasis on minimizing the visual distortion.
While the equal distribution can indeed provide smaller distortion, the major difference lies in
the reduction of bandwidth. On average there is a bandwidth savings of 47% when switching
from equal distribution to the Lagrangian approach.
In-painted Sequences Minnesota Board Two-persons Three-persons
Bitrate (kbps)
Lagrangian 945.81 97.84 361.64 511.06
Equal 1696.04 127.71 1018.67 1208.75
PSNR-Y (dB)
Lagrangian 31.84 37.69 35.41 34.16
Equal 31.34 37.68 34.28 33.45
Distortion
Lagrangian 27.72 15.48 20.15 26.52
Equal 18.86 14.80 16.65 16.26
TABLE III
COMPARING THE PERFORMANCES BETWEEN LAGRANGIAN AND EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF HIDDEN DATA AMONG DCT
BLOCKS.
C. Different Privacy Protection Schemes
In the third experiment, we contrast the performances of the greedy scheme over different
privacy protection schemes. As one of the key advantages of data hiding for privacy data
preservation is its universal applicability to different obfuscation schemes, it is of interest to
consider their performances. We have run the greedy irreversible scheme with QP =1 0for all
6 videos at three different obfuscation schemes. Table IV summarizes the results. The ﬁrst
row shows the luma PSNR of the sequences after the embedding and compression. While
using a constant quantizer would have produced constant quality in a normal video encoder,
the presence of hidden data degrades the quality and affects the overall PSNR. The variations
in PSNR can be better interpreted using the percentage drop as compared with those of the
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encoded sequences without hidden data. Also the percentage drop allows us to compare the
impact of data embedding across different obfuscation techniques which produce very different
video sequences. These numbers are shown in the second row – the large drop in PSNR in
Minnesota, Two-persons, and Three-persons is due to the large amount of hidden data caused
by the dynamically moving foreground objects. The lower PSNR drop in the scrambled versions
compared with the other two is due to the concentration of the hidden data among the high
spatial-temporal frequency scrambled areas. In a typical residual frame, most DCT coefﬁcients
are close to zero and those coefﬁcients enjoy little distortion due to quantization. Hiding data
in these zero coefﬁcients statistically causes a higher relative decrease in PSNR when compared
with non-zero coefﬁcients. The scrambling process introduces many non-zero high frequency
coefﬁcients that attract hidden data, thus reducing the amount of loss in PSNR as compared
to the silhouette and in-painted schemes. These high frequency coefﬁcients are chosen because
they introduce less perceptual distortion, as indicated in the measurements in the third row. On
the other hand, these high frequency coefﬁcients are very difﬁcult to compress. The resulting
bitrates after data hiding as shown in the fourth row clearly demonstrate this phenomenon.
Similar to PSNR, we also consider the relative increase in bitrates as compared with those
of compressing the modiﬁed videos and privacy data separately. While it is expected that the
hidden data introduces minor or even negative bitrate increase in scrambled videos, there are
signiﬁcant increases in bitrate among silhouette and in-painted sequences – they range from 26%
to more than 100%. These increases are more signiﬁcant among the in-painted sequences than
the silhouette sequences. To understand these increases, we calculate the ratio of bitrates of the
mark (hidden data) to the cover work (obfuscated video without hidden data) in the last row. It
is observed that the bitrate increase correlates well with this ratio. The highest three increases in
bitrate correspond to the bitrate ratios larger than one, i.e. the hidden data is in fact larger in size
than the obfuscated video. This violates a typical assumption used in most data hiding schemes
and it is quite conceivable that our scheme operates less than efﬁcient in such an extraordinary
condition.
D. Different Operating Parameters
In the fourth experiment, we ran our data hiding algorithm under varying design parameters
like QP and δ . This is carried out on the two longer sequences: “Hall” and “Conference” using
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In-painted Sequences Minnesota Board Two-persons Three-persons Conference Hall
PSNR-Y (dB)
Silhouette 34.87 38.47 38.13 37.54 35.72 35.15
Scrambled 31.58 35.74 34.65 33.77 34.61 33.49
In-painted 31.84 37.80 35.36 34.31 34.96 33.43
PSNR-Y Drop %
Silhouette 9.7 1.8 8.4 9.7 2.4 3.8
Scrambled 8.3 1.2 5.0 5.5 2.0 3.2
In-painted 9.7 1.3 9.7 11.2 2.5 3.6
Distortion
Silhouette 28.14 18.29 22.71 28.84 27.11 28.97
Scrambled 25.47 14.72 17.76 17.96 19.30 20.35
In-painted 30.85 18.83 22.95 30.46 27.29 28.53
Bitrate (kbps)
Silhouette 1087.0 92.4 387.5 587.2 145.2 315.0
Scrambled 1301.2 822.9 798.4 1124.3 359.8 1113.0
In-painted 933.5 96.1 345.8 473.1 127.7 285.2
Bitrate Increase %
Silhouette 61.9 29.2 91.6 78.9 31.1 45.5
Scrambled 27.1 1.4 -1.4 -0.8 -3.0 -4.1
In-painted 87.0 26.2 115.8 111.2 44.6 59.6
Mark-to-Work Bitrate
Silhouette 0.66 0.44 1.46 1.07 0.53 0.60
Scrambled 0.35 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.08
In-painted 1.16 0.40 3.00 3.13 0.77 0.83
TABLE IV
COMPARING THE PERFORMANCES AMONG DIFFERENT VIDEO OBFUSCATION SCHEMES.
inpainting as the obfuscation scheme. Irreversible embedding is examined in this section and
reversible embedding in the next section. Four QP parameters are used: 5, 10, 15, and 20 and
three δ values are used: 0, 0.5, and 1. QP deﬁnes the quantization parameter of the codec for
compressing both the modiﬁed video and privacy information while δ is the control parameter
between rate and distortion during the optimization. δ =0gives the distortion based optimization
ignoring rate increase while δ =1minimizes only the rate increase during the selection of
embedding coefﬁcients. Table V and Table VI summarize the results for both sequences. The
notations Ro, Rp and Re denote the rates of obfuscated (inpainted) bit stream, privacy bit stream
and embedded bit stream respectively. From the tables, we can observe, as expected, that the
rate increase reduces while the perceptual distortion increases with an increase in the control
parameter δ. Despite the increase in the bitrates of the privacy streams, the percentages of bitrate
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QP Ro (kbps) Rp (kbps) δ Re (kbps) Rate Increase % PSNR-Y (dB) PSNR-Y Drop % Distortion
5 359.72 161.38
0 754.5 44.79 36.77 3.29 15.76
0.5 698.04 33.96 36.76 3.31 21.06
1 690.54 32.52 36.73 3.39 58.61
10 97.36 81.26
0 314.32 75.97 33.45 3.57 22.59
0.5 285.15 59.64 33.43 3.63 28.53
1 267.50 49.76 33.42 3.66 98.76
15 59.12 54.77
0 202.98 78.22 31.37 3.77 28.64
0.5 186.38 63.65 31.42 3.62 34.95
1 170.50 49.71 31.30 3.99 138.77
20 44.9 42.82
0 152.87 74.27 29.93 3.64 35.39
0.5 141.9 61.76 29.97 3.51 41.92
1 129.1 47.17 29.82 3.99 178.27
TABLE V
RATE AND DISTORTION FOR IRREVERSIBLE EMBEDDING HALL-MONITOR AT VARYING QP AND δ VALUES
QP Ro (kbps) Rp (kbps) δ Re (kbps) Rate Increase % PSNR-Y (dB) PSNR-Y Drop % Distortion
5 122.42 76.17
0 309.27 55.73 38.29 3.28 18.02
0.5 279.37 40.68 38.34 3.16 28.67
1 275.02 38.49 38.29 3.28 60.38
10 49.81 38.44
0 135.50 53.54 34.94 2.57 28.16
0.5 123.63 40.09 34.95 2.54 39.58
1 120.93 37.03 34.84 2.84 94.18
15 36.41 28.66
0 94.12 44.64 33.19 2.35 39.99
0.5 87.97 35.19 33.22 2.27 47.93
1 85.87 31.97 33.05 2.77 134.61
20 30.33 23.96
0 74.23 36.73 31.89 2.39 51.33
0.5 70.66 30.15 31.86 2.48 58.95
1 68.41 26.01 31.85 2.51 161.62
TABLE VI
RATE AND DISTORTION FOR IRREVERSIBLE EMBEDDING FOR CONFERENCE AT VARYING QP AND δ VALUES
increase in the embedded stream stay the same or drop at higher QP’s due to the presence of
more non-zero coefﬁcients that are more suitable for hiding data. Also, the results from both
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the sequences conﬁrm that PSNR is not a good measure for the cost computation as it doesn’t
vary much with parameter δ, while the perceptual distortion measure better correlates with it.
Figure 6 highlights the better visual correlation of the perceptual distortion measure compared
to PSNR for the embedding of same hidden information at different locations by using λ =0
versus λ =1 . Figure 7 shows a sample frame from Hall-Monitor sequence before and after
irreversible embedding at variable values of QP and δ.
Fig. 6. Visual Difference between two frames after embedding showing better correlation to Perceptual Distortion measure
compared to PSNR. Left: PSNR = 34.28 , D = 16.65 ; Right: PSNR = 34.71 , D = 149.64
E. Reversible Embedding
The same experiment with varying QP and δ is also repeated for the case of reversible
embedding. As introduced in Section IV-C, the reversible embedding can only be used when
there is no inter-dependency between the frames. Though the embedding is done in a reversible
fashion, the prediction loop used in inter-coded frames propagate the effect of hidden data
to future frames making the process irreversible. Hence this experiment is conducted in two
special encoder structures. In the ﬁrst structure, each frame is coded using intra mode (I frame)
only. This setting is similar to the M-JPEG standard typically found in many IP cameras. The
privacy information is also encoded in the same fashion as we assume that the system only
has access to a codec which has no capabilities of temporal prediction. In the second structure,
we operate the embedding process over the enhanced intra frames (EI frames) of a scalable
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Fig. 7. Sample frame (200
th) from Hall-Monitor sequence - irreversible embedding at varying QP and δ. Rows from Top to
Bottom: Inpainted Frame, Privacy Frame, Data embedded frames with δ = 0, 0.5, and 1. Columns from Left to Right: QP = 5,
10, 15, and 20.
codec. We use the SNR scalability to derive the enhancement layers. The base layer is always
coded at QP = 20 and the enhancement layers are generated to achieve the desired quantization
effect. Table VII summarizes the encoding performances of the two structures at different coding
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parameters for hall monitor and sequence. As observed from the table, the EI-frame structure
yields better results in terms of percentage rate increase and perceptual distortion when compared
to embedding in intra frames (I frames). Figure 8 shows a sample frame from Conference before
and after reversible embedding on intra-coded frames at variable values of QP and δ.
QP δ
Re (kbps) Rate Increase Distortion
I EI I EI I EI
Hall Monitor
5
0 6357.18 2952.49 34.54 11.86 448.80 137.89
0.5 6225.73 2895.05 31.76 9.69 449.70 149.19
1 6171.53 2877.52 30.61 9.02 791.91 186.96
10
0 4486.32 1460.35 42.65 6.86 177.87 157.18
0.5 4236.80 1441.40 34.72 5.47 205.28 170.34
1 4227.27 1439.44 11.94 5.33 216.24 182.05
15
0 3734.78 1025.34 48.02 5.54 235.81 140.01
0.5 3548.35 1023.92 40.63 5.40 249.32 167.56
1 3520.27 1016.06 39.52 4.59 263.15 244.73
20
0 3228.89 822.79 47.82 7.25 290.19 140.45
0.5 3154.32 812.12 44.41 5.86 291.26 165.05
1 3104.45 810.54 42.12 5.65 306.59 309.36
Conference
5
0 4637.92 2190.74 30.90 3.28 104.69 80.79
0.5 4624.90 2172.82 30.53 2.44 120.08 82.53
1 4602.82 2164.65 29.91 2.05 131.70 103.17
10
0 3292.24 1143.23 41.21 2.19 154.80 118.28
0.5 3280.63 1131.16 40.71 1.11 167.42 120.66
1 3277.95 1128.78 40.60 0.90 248.62 143.75
15
0 2849.20 868.24 47.19 2.02 187.94 106.50
0.5 2845.70 859.10 47.11 0.95 193.69 146.05
1 2820.19 857.51 45.79 0.76 287.39 195.25
20
0 2630.75 739.25 51.21 3.25 207.57 125.42
0.5 2555.75 735.21 46.90 2.68 210.97 157.84
1 2514.27 729.63 44.52 1.90 362.06 251.81
TABLE VII
RATE AND DISTORTION FOR REVERSIBLE EMBEDDING USING EITHER INTRA-CODED FRAMES (I) OR ENHANCED
INTRA-FRAMES (EI) AT VARYING QP AND δ VALUES.
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Fig. 8. Sample frame (200
th) from Conference - reversible embedding at varying QP and δ. Rows from Top to Bottom:
Inpainted Frame, Privacy Frame, Data embedded frames with δ = 0, 0.5, and 1. Columns from Left to Right: QP = 5, 10, 15,
and 20.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a privacy-protecting video surveillance system which offers
multiple levels of secure privacy information preservation. Novel irreversible and reversible data
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hiding methods have been proposed to hide large amount of privacy information into the host
video. An optimization framework has been proposed to identify DCT coefﬁcients for hiding
information that simultaneously minimize the perceptual distortion and the rate increase caused
due to embedded information. Extensive experimental results have been presented to demonstrate
the efﬁcient implementation of our algorithms and their effectiveness in preserving privacy data.
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